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Purpose: The aim of the article is to show a kind of reevaluation of international legal 
regulations on safety and security of contemporary countries. The essence of this process is a 
visible reversal of the perception of legal regulations contained in legal acts of the universally 
understood international law as effective. The author's intention is to characterize various 
models of public safety management in the time of a pandemic. In particular, the author 
analyzes the effectiveness of the most controversial measures used by state authorities to limit 
the effects of the COVID-19 virus. 
Design/Methodology/Approach: The article refers to both selected solutions functioning in 
the national law systems of individual countries, as well as acts of international law. The 
analysis essentially uses the comparative and historical-legal methods. The text is based on 
the analysis of selected legal acts, positions of representatives of the doctrine, literature, and 
documents. 
Findings: The results showed that despite the continuous process of positivization of threats - 
both at the level of national and international law and the creation of more and more perfect 
catalogs of human rights, in the face of the coronavirus pandemic, the current belief in the 
durability of the developed value system in the field of protection of individual rights becomes 
seriously threatened. It was emphasized that the pandemic period was a specific test of the 
mechanisms of democracy. Attention was drawn to the high probability of changes in the 
content of the international agreements in force so far in the field of international human rights 
law. Moreover, it was indicated that once the current threat is contained, the necessary 
redefinition of the material legal and procedural conditions related to the application of 
disease reduction measures in pandemic states in national legal systems will occur.  
Practical Implications: The considerations in the article may be useful in designing national 
models of public safety management. 
Originality/Value: The article extends the available literature in the field of both international 
security law and legal security conditions of individual countries. The study offers an in-depth 
insight into activities - often controversial - undertaken by the authorities of selected countries 
under various models of public safety management and protection of citizens' health. 
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The COVID-19 virus is a deadly threat to billions of people around the world. There 
is no doubt that pandemic affects countries' functioning and impacts the effectiveness 
of both mechanisms of democratic institutions and legal systems. Today, we are 
witnessing an unprecedented change in national law in most countries of the world, 
which is intended to guarantee the security of citizens and strengthen economies. 
There is no doubt that the international community now has faced the greatest 
challenge in decades to ensure the population's security at the global, regional, and 
national levels. The author aims to show a re-evaluation of international legal 
regulations on security and protection of public health and analyze the acts of national 
law, based on which selected countries try to counteract the effects of the pandemic. 
The paper will make it possible to point out and discuss the implications of countries' 
return to the traditional perception of creating legal security regulations as an attribute 
of the State authorities.  
 
The paper will highlight the clearly noticeable crisis of confidence in the UN's 
specialized agency, the WHO. The text is intended to analyze how far the transfer of 
the burden of the fight against COVID-19 to individual countries will be an instrument 
for creating more effective national legislation on security management. The nature 
of the new regulations relating to the pandemic that such regulations have appeared 
in countries' legal systems shall be presented. Finally, the controversy surrounding the 
application by countries of legal regulations to guarantee the protection of citizens in 
the pandemic time shall be highlighted. Due to the text's formula and the acceptable 
volume of the text, the author referred only to legal solutions and aspects of public 
administration activity in selected countries. 
 
2. Re-Evaluation of International Legal Regulations and Criticism of the 
Wealth Health Organization (WHO) 
 
The essence of the process - mentioned in the paper's introduction - of re-evaluation 
of international legal regulations related to the sphere of public security and health 
protection is a clear reversal of the perception of legal regulations, contained in legal 
acts of international law in its broadest sense, as effective regulations. The starting 
point for this consideration must be a reminder that on March 11, 2020, the Director-
General of the World Health Organisation (WHO) reported that the threat posed by 
COVID-19 was classified as a pandemic. It is a common belief that before the 
outbreak of the coronavirus COVID-19 pandemic, the WHO was perceived as the key 
and most competent organization of the international community responsible, among 
others, for the establishment of the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network.  
 
Lawyers such as Anastasia Telesetsky highlight the WHO's achievements in 
implementing better international coordination practices around pandemics. She 







Health Regulations and improving the global capacity to prevent, detect, and respond 
to threats from infectious diseases such as the influenza pandemic (Telesetsky, 2020). 
Such a positive assessment of the WHO's activities, especially in monitoring the scale 
of the COVID-19 threat in China, is currently not supported by many of the world's 
leaders. 
 
The narrative of representatives of countries such as the United States and Japan 
reveals criticism of the World Health Organisation and confirms the previously 
formulated thesis. Attention should be drawn to the particular importance of the 
statements made by the President of the United States, Donald Trump, who clearly 
pointed out the guilt and negligence of the World Health Organisation, in which such 
statements were combined with criticism of Chinese policy. In particular, he stressed 
in his statements that: 
 
“The WHO failed to adequately obtain, vet and share information in a timely 
and transparent fashion […]Through  the middle of January, it parroted (virus 
- author's note) ... the idea that there was no human-to-human transmission  
happening despite... clear evidence to the contrary” [BBC, 2020]. 
 
Simultaneously, the organization's criticism was combined with the accusation made 
against the World Health Organisation regarding the WHO dependency on China. 
Although these accusations against the WHO has not been supported by the leader's 
reference to specific facts, the tangible effect of the criticism was the statement made 
by Donald Trump on May 29, 2020, in which he announced that the funds directed to 
the WHO so far, would be channelled as contributions to the US global health 
priorities.  
 
On July 6, 2020, the administration officially notified the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations to leave the WHO (Borger, 2020). Lawrence O. Gostin, Harold 
Hongju Koh, Michelle Williams, Margaret A. Hamburg, Georges Benjamin, William 
H. Foege, and other researchers have pointed out that the policy adopted carries 
significant threats for the United States, including in the research field, see works 
related to vaccines. Besides, the World Health Organisation has a strategic role in 
coordinating international efforts to combat infectious diseases. “Withdrawal from 
WHO would have dire consequences for US security, diplomacy and influence. WHO 
has unmatched global reach and legitimacy.  
 
The US administration would be hard pressed to disentangle the country from 
WHO governance and programmes. The Pan American Health Organization 
(PAHO) is among six WHO regional offices and is headquartered in Washington, 
DC, USA. The USA is also a state party to two WHO treaties the WHO 
Constitution, establishing it as the “directing and co-ordinating authority on 
international health”; and the International Health Regulations (IHR, 2005), the 
governing framework for epidemic preparedness and response” (Gostin et al., 
2020). 
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Interestingly, the leading politicians in Japan are speaking in a similar tone to the 
American leader. Although they deny the willingness to stop paying their membership 
fee to the World Health Organisation, the allegations they make are serious. In their 
opinion, the most important was the failure of the World Health Organisation to 
inform countries about the actual scale of the threat posed by the COVID-19 virus, 
which in turn resulted in other countries being insufficiently prepared for the imminent 
threat. They stress that the World Health Organisation leaders, in particular the 
previous Director-General of the organization, Margaret Chan, are not sufficiently 
responsible for previous negligence. It should be recalled that the Deputy Prime 
Minister of the Japanese Government of Taro Aso said that the name of the 
organization should be changed to CHO, which stands for China Health Organisation 
(sic!) (Hernandez, 2020; Krishnan, 2020).  
 
Similar, although somewhat less robust, allegations are made against the WHO by the 
Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, who believes that the organization requires 
reform, as there are significant allegations that it was not politically neutral 
(Kyodonews, 2020). The veiled criticism addressed to the World Health Organisation 
can also be seen from the G20 countries. At this year's summit, which was held 
remotely because of the threat of a pandemic, one of the meeting's conclusions was 
the conviction that the WHO should cooperate with other international organizations 
to assess gaps in readiness to combat a pandemic (Lee and Nereim, 2020).   
 
The need for reform of the WHO and thus a kind of revision of the international 
agreements that define the organization's tasks is also recognized by researchers such 
as Olivier Nay, Marie-Paule Kieny, Lelio Marmora, and Michel Kazatchkine, who 
believe that the World Health Organisation, despite its shortcomings, has proved its 
worth - especially the WHO Health Emergencies Programme. This program has 
managed to control outbreaks of yellow fever, polio, smallpox, Zika virus disease, and 
Ebola virus disease (Nay et al., 2020, p. 1818-1819). Concerning the current global 
crisis, cannot be overlooked that some researchers have already highlighted the 
possible threats of having too much faith in the power of cross-border cooperation, 
medical development, and the global dimension of vaccine research. As early as 2001, 
Obijiofor Aginam wrote, referring to reports by the World Health Organization, that: 
 
“The discovery of antibiotics, the feat of worldwide eradication of small-pox, and the 
progress made in rolling back the morbidity and mortality of poliomy-elitis, leprosy, 
measles, guinea-worm, and neonatal tetanus slowed global health work with the 
optimism that the battle between humanity and the microbial world was being won by 
humans. This cautious optimism turned into a fatal complacency that is costing 
millions of lives annually. Diseases previously restricted geographically are now 
striking in regions once thought to be safe. Tuberculosis (TB), for instance, is fighting 
back with renewed ferocity. In the contest for supremacy, "microbes are sprinting 
ahead. The gap between their ability to mutate into drug-resistant strains and man's 







It should also be remembered that the broadly defined sphere of international law 
means not only regulations in the field of international security law or regulations 
governing the creation of international organizations, see World Health Organization, 
but also legal regulations relating to human rights protection their guarantees. This is 
also the nature of the current crisis, a health crisis, and an economic and social crisis.  
 
The characteristic features of the reality of the COVID-19 pandemic are the numerous 
restrictions on the exercise of the fundamental right of free movement of individuals, 
earning opportunities or, last but not least, the rivalry between countries in terms of 
access to the medical resources necessary to limit the effects of the virus. The authors 
of the report prepared under the United Nations' auspices stress that the essence of the 
extensive blockades assumed by countries is the limitation of opportunities arising 
from inherent human rights (UN Report, 2020, p. 2). According to the authors of the 
study, the aim should be to strengthen international cooperation, cooperate within 
research works on the vaccine, address the issue of intellectual property, and ensure 
access to treatment for all and an affordable price of the vaccine. These 
recommendations may seem trivial in the context of previous allegations against the 
WHO.  
  
At present, to an exceptional degree, only found in times of armed conflict, countries 
are united in the conviction that their citizens' security should be ensured regardless 
of the costs, commitments, or rules of the free market. This conviction can exemplify 
two events that can exemplify this conviction resident Donald Trump's administration, 
as quoted by the media. The administration stressed its willingness to pay "large sums 
of money" to the German pharmaceutical company CureVac in exchange for the 
United States' exclusive access to an effective coronavirus vaccine. The Federal 
Republic saw this of Germany's government as an attempt at an aggressive takeover 
(Oltermann, 2020).  
 
The second interesting aspect of modern conditions for combating the virus pandemic, 
to which numerous observers have drawn attention, is China's attempt to use the threat 
posed by COVID-19 to rebuild its position on the international arena as a reliable and, 
at the same time, necessary partner to secure huge material needs, mainly in terms of 
huge supplies of ventilators and hygienic masks. Albin Sybera points out that some 
Central and Eastern European countries, such as Serbia and the Czech Republic, 
highlight the close relations between these countries and Beijing ceremonially, and 
the very reception of paid medical aid transports is of a very high nature. Such activity 
is seen as a perception by some authoritarian State countries, like China, to be a more 
valuable and reliable partner than the European Union (Siberia, 2020).  
 
Moreover, the problem is broader than it might seem, given that the much richer 
European countries decide to use aid from countries against which they had previously 
imposed sanctions themselves. It should be recalled that the Italian Republic was a 
beneficiary, in March 2020, of medical aid provided by the Russian Federation. It 
should be noted, in particular, that this aid was provided in the form of the deployment 
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of Russian soldiers and military equipment, while the media spread the sight of nine 
IŁ-76 transport machines landing at the Italian air force base near Rome.  
  
The fundamental question is how far individual countries will be willing to go in the 
restrictions and lock-downs they apply to maximize the effectiveness of counteracting 
the effects of the coronavirus pandemic and, importantly, the effects of the expected 
next wave of the pandemic? Secondly, whether these countries' societies will accept 
to be subjected to yet another, increasingly severe restrictions? 
 
3. Public Security Management Models: From Sweden to Israel - one Goal, 
Different Measures 
 
As pointed out in the sub-chapter title, a general and seemingly quite misleading 
conclusion can be drawn that individual countries are deliberately adopting different 
strategies and using different means of action with the single aim to strengthen the 
protection of their societies against COVID-19 coronavirus. As will be demonstrated, 
the application of various measures restricting the development of the coronavirus 
pandemic, on the one hand, is controversial, especially in the light of the protection 
of human rights, and on the other, seems to be a necessity. After all, during the 
pandemic, governments often concluded that the prevention and mitigation action 
programs they had adopted were not effective, which gave impetus to a change in 
approach to guaranteeing public security. Matilda Hellman's doctrine states that it is 
necessary to update the measures taken, writing that “The COVID-19 pandemic has 
exposed a demand for an updated overview of the nature, functions, and limitations 
of social control policies in the 2020s” (Hellman, 2020, p. 206). 
 
This staying between Scylla of the bacteriological threat and Charybda of the needs 
of the administrative bodies of individual countries causes an increase of awareness 
of the reappraisal and inadequacy of legal guarantees of the citizens' security in 
individual countries, and the COVID-19 virus itself has become a factor initiating a 
review of the extent of the necessity to subject selected human rights to a partial 
derogation. 
 
There is no doubt that it is right to state that, regardless of the complexity of the 
pandemic caused by COVID-19, it is currently the national governments that bear the 
main burden of counteracting the epidemiological threat, rather than international 
organizations such as the WHO. It is worth noting that the legal doctrine has not yet 
outlined the problem of a possible further politicization of the COVID-19 threats in 
the sphere of public security in terms of national law. It is worth noting that a 
characteristic feature of the current pandemic is the adoption by individual countries 
of specific aid packages for economies intended to protect jobs and stop the decline 
in GDP. The aid measures taken are not surprising given the deadly effect of the 







For example, the US economy is estimated to have suffered a contraction of 32.9% 
and has recorded its greatest collapse since the 1940s (Kollewe, 2020). In the Federal 
Republic of Germany, on the other hand, according to data reported by the Federal 
Statistical Office, gross domestic product in the quarter-to-quarter comparison from 
April to June decreased by 10.1%, and the recorded decrease was the most serious 
since the establishment of the Federal Statistical Office (Nienaber, 2020). What seems 
to be particularly interesting from the author's point of view is the measures that some 
countries are using to guarantee the effectiveness of the restrictions associated with 
COVID-19. Some of these measures are controversial, especially in countries 
implementing the democratic State of law model. 
 
Concerning the various models for managing public security and citizens' health 
protection, it should be recalled that the tool that characterized the actions of the vast 
majority of governments in the world was the imposition of numerous restrictions on 
the population and the use of quarantine. From the beginning, the Swedish 
Government's behaviour has differed in a controversial way from these countries. This 
government was strongly believed that the imposition of restrictive limitations and 
regulations should be minimized, preferring the method of recommendation bans and 
referring to citizens' responsibility. In particular, the need to slow down the virus was 
stressed, emphasizing protecting older and more vulnerable citizens. It should be 
noted that, unlike in other Scandinavian countries, the authorities have not closed 
primary schools.  
 
They also stressed the negative effects of quarantine on the efficiency of the health 
protection system. As we remember, the media showed pictures of citizens spending 
time in restaurants and cafés, while in other countries they remained closed. 
According to official data from the World Health Organization, this peculiar laissez-
faire approach to combating the COVID-19 pandemic has so far ended with 86,891 
recorded cases and 5814 deaths (WHO, 2020) as of August 27, 2020.  
 
Heba Habib, referring to the effectiveness of the Swedish model, stresses that the 
authorities have failed to improve herd immunity and that the victims of coronavirus, 
contrary to the government's expectations, have been older adults in particular. She 
also shows that: “Sweden has the largest number of cases and fatalitiesings 
Scandinavia—around 37,000 confirmed cases  at the time of writing, compared with 
its neighbours Denmark, Norway, and Finland which have 12  000, 8000, and 7000 
cases, respectively. All three neighbouring countries adopted a lock-down approach 
early in the pandemic, which they are now slowly lifting. All three have since re-
opened their borders, but not to Sweden. Sweden recorded the most coronavirus 
deaths per capita in Europe in a seven-day average between the 25th of May and the 
2nd of June” (Habib, 2020, p.1). 
 
It is impossible to ignore that other countries also had a flexible approach to forcing 
their societies to adopt certain behaviors related to the COVID-19 pandemic. The 
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author specifically refers to the example of the United Kingdom, which, after all, quite 
quickly chose a restrictive model with partial closure and quarantine. 
 
The pandemic's realities, linked to the speed of coronavirus transfer and the degree of 
threat it poses to people's lives, have reviewed national strategies. The Russian 
Federation can be an example. As you know, back in April 2020, Doctor Alexander 
Myasnikov, who is head of the coronavirus information Center, stressed optimistically 
that the virus could not spread within the Russian Federation. The restrictive 
regulations and restrictions implemented in Russia, which closed the country's borders 
completely on March 15, 2020 (TASS, 2020) or implemented restrictions on traffic 
over huge stretches of thousands of kilometres - including Finland, Poland, Belarus, 
Ukraine, and China - ultimately did not stop the spread of coronavirus, according to 
official WHO data. At present - data as of August 28, 2020, more than 975,000 illness 
due to COVID-19 and 16,804 deaths (WHO, 2020) have been reported in Russia. In 
Russia, health care is guaranteed by the State, and health care institutions were 
regarded as prepared to combat bacteriological threats.  
 
It is not surprising, therefore, that some democratic countries, such as the United 
Kingdom and Israel, as well as the people' democratic countries, see China, have 
decided to use much more controversial measures than local closures, restrictions on 
the number of participants in mass events or a ban on convening them or holding 
weddings. The aim of using methods, which are considered to be a significant 
encroachment on citizens' privacy, including violations of medical data protection, 
was to guarantee the effectiveness of anti-pandemic measures taken. Paradoxically, it 
would seem that practically all preventive and protective measures should be allowed 
in the face of the avalanche of COVID-19 cases.  
 
However, the methods described as invigorating and violating the human right to 
privacy cannot and will not long be accepted by a large proportion of citizens, even 
though human health and life are at stake, and no one has yet developed an effective 
and proven COVID-19 vaccine.  Of course, international human rights law, and thus 
the legal systems of countries that have signed and ratified international agreements 
establishing human rights, allow these rights to be derogated, most often connected 
with a particularly serious threat to public security and health. This is undoubtedly the 
coronavirus pandemic. A factor justifying the reference to the derogation clauses by 
national governments is the declaration of emergency states. It is worth recalling 
Article 4, section 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966, 
which contains the grounds for an application by countries of a derogation from 
human rights.  
 
The precondition for suspending the application of the obligations guaranteed by the 
Covenant is the official declaration of a public emergency state (ICCPR, 1966). In 
some countries, the authorities have decided not to proclaim an emergency state; 







12, 2020 [gov.pl, 2020] or the epidemic state (Poland since March 20, 2020) 
(Ordinance by the Minister of Health, 2020), which is the legal justification for some 
of the actions taken. 
 
Looking at the practical dimension of actions by means of which countries try to 
minimize the effects of COVID-19 infection, the paremia Mater semper certa est 
arises. This is what the ancient Romans used to say when they laid the foundations of 
family law, while the posteriors, in the broader sense, emphasized the inviolability of 
the principles and clarity of Roman law. After all, this principle has become obsolete 
these days, with the discovery of the surrogacy possibility. Illustrated the enormous 
progress in technology, which has made the aforementioned legal paremia obsolete, 
caused the public administration of modern countries has been able to supervise and 
invigilate the citizen in an increasingly perfect way, with morals, but not always legal, 
the justification for such actions. As it were, it is a matter of sadness, in the course of 
the deliberations, that the law is definitely losing the race against technological 
developments. 
 
In this regard, it should be recalled that in mid-March 2020, the Prime Minister of the 
Israeli Government, Benjamin Netanyahu, authorized the Shin Bet secret security 
service to use mobile phone data to identify citizens who should be quarantined. The 
measure's essence was to trace with whom people who were found to have coronavirus 
were meeting. On the 15 of March this year, the Israeli Prime Minister stressed that 
the government would approve emergency regulations the day after, i.e., on the 16th 
of March. With the Attorney General's consent, it will be possible to use the data 
collected for 30 days. It is worth quoting Banjamin Netanyahu, who said on the 15th 
of March “Israel is a democracy. We have to maintain the balance between the rights 
of the individual and needs of general society, and we are doing that” (Halbfinger et 
al., 2020). 
 
As David M. Halbfinger, Isabel Kershner and Ronen Bergman stress, the reference to 
the public interest in the context of such an important violation of the right to privacy 
must be controversial, especially among cabinet critics, lawyers and human rights 
defenders, especially given the fact that the Shin Bet service has been collecting 
mobile phone user data since 2002 (sic!), many years before the outbreak of the 
pandemic. “It is the existence of the cellphone metadata trove and its use to track 
coronavirus patients and carriers that privacy advocates say poses the greatest test of 
Israeli democracy at an extraordinarily fragile moment” (Halbfinger et al., 2020). 
 
 The controversy surrounding the authorization of the government special secret 
agencies to track citizens based on mobile data is evidenced by the ruling of the 
Supreme Court of Israel that the tracking of COVID-19 carriers by Shin Bet is 
admissible, provided, however, that this action is legally formalized in the legislation 
(Lubell, 2020). A panel of judges with President of Supreme Court Esther Hayut has 
conditionally extended the government's authorization for the secret government 
special agencies while obliging the administration to initiate the legislative process. 
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Undoubtedly, the Supreme Court's judgment is a kind of milestone not only for 
ensuring the legalism of government administration's actions but in a broader sense; 
it will symbolize the advantage of legalism over short-term effectiveness. In its ruling, 
the court stressed that the tracking program initiated by Shin Bet “[...] severely 
violates the constitutional right to privacy and should not be taken lightly. [...] The 
choice to use the state’s preventive security organization to monitor those who do not 
seek to harm it, without the consent of the surveillance subjects, poses great difficulty 
and effort must be made to find another suitable alternative that fulfils the principles 
of privacy protection” (Winer and Staff, 2020). 
  
The consideration should be supplemented by the observation that researchers have a 
different perception of the solution adopted. As Glen Segell sceptically points out: 
“Such phone surveillance, could set a dangerous precedent for civil liberties to 
monitor citizens’ movements. The consequences are that citizens’ s smartphones 
could be a tool of mass surveillance and targeted containment. So, such intrusive 
measures might result in people leaving their phones at home even during emergencies 
and pandemics” (Segell, 2020, p 3). 
 
Jurists also support similar reservations. For example, the long-standing Deputy 
Attorney General of Israel, Malkiel Blass, emphasizes the importance of guaranteeing 
citizens' rights even when compared with the threat posed by COVID-19 (Dobieski, 
2020). A more moderate assessment of the Israeli authorities' conduct is made by 
Tehilla Shwartz Altshuler and Rachel Aridor Hershkowitz, who are optimistic about 
the responsible attitude of the society towards specific prevention measures in the age 
of the virus and the acceptance by the people of specific forms of supervision by the 
secret government special agencies. In their view, this is due to the customer's trust in 
the Israelis place in the Armed Forces and Security Services (Shwartz and 
Hershkowitz, 2020a). Simultaneously, according to the same authors, the Israeli 
model of protection and prevention against the coronavirus pandemic should be seen 
as less intrusive to the individual's rights than the Chinese one and more ailment than 
that used in South Korea or Taiwan (Shwartz and Hershkowitz, 2020b).  
 
Analysis of legal regulations contained in one of the most important legal acts related 
to public security in Israel, i.e., General Security Service Law indicates expressis 
verbis that both the limitation of access to users' data (included in Article 13 of the 
Act) and the decision which data will be transferred to the secret government special 
agencies, constitute a prerogative that is at the disposal of the executive authority, i.e., 
the Prime Minister. Article 11, section B of the Act contains “The Prime Minister may 
prescribe by rules that categories of information found in the databases of a license 
holder as specified in the rules are required by the Service for the purpose of fulfilling 
its functions under this Law and that the license holder must transmit information of 








With regard to the controversial solution applied in Israel, it should be mentioned that 
other countries, including the European Union, also apply measures to trace the 
contacts of infected persons, however in countries such as France, the Federal 
Republic of Germany or the United Kingdom, the analysis of data takes place in health 
care institutions or with the consent by the user himself, and not, as in Israel, in the 
secret government special agencies. Currently, there are two main models for 
collecting and storing data on users of mobile devices.  
 
The first one relies on centralized acquisition of cell phone location data from 
cellular providers in a particular country.  The information is fed into a data pool and 
is then processed. The processing can be performed by a civilian government agency 
— such as the healthcare authorities — or by security agencies that enjoy direct 
access to the cellular infrastructure in order to protect national security and prevent 
terrorism and crime — such as the Israeli General Security Service (GSS). The 
processing can be carried out by creating in-house expertise within these agencies, 
or by private firms on secured government servers. [...] The second main form of 
digital contact tracing is based on made-to-order apps.  The installation of such 
contact-tracing apps on individuals’ devices may be voluntary or mandatory, and 
their architecture may be centralized or decentralized (Shwartz and Hershkowitz, 
2020b, p. 3-4). 
 
It should be noted that, paradoxically, in the State such as Israel, where the nation and 
its security are so dependent on efficient secret government special agencies and the 
army, which have access to specific information for their effectiveness, see the 
prevention of terrorist attacks or the quarantine of coronavirus vectors, there is 
noticeable public opposition against the use of these data collection methods. 
Recently, the popularity of special cases/etuis for mobile phones, bought in Israel to 
interfere with Shin Bet's monitoring of their location and user data, has been observed. 
According to the manufacturer, the housing called Silent Pocket Faraday is intended 
to isolate the device from mobile communications completely, GPS locations, RFID 
communications, Wi-Fi (Jean, 2020). Interestingly, in other countries that do not 
apply such restrictive measures for monitoring the COVID-19 virus, there has not 
been any popularity of this type of device so far.   
 
Finally, it should be noted that efficient institutions of a democratic State, which are 
key elements of the checks and balances system, such as the Norwegian Data 
Protection Authority (DPA), can significantly influence the pandemic's development 
combat system. In June 2020, DPA informed the Norwegian Institute of Public Health 
that the Smittestopp application for contact tracking to monitor the spread of COVID-
19 is a highly intrusive measure regarding data protection cannot be verified that the 
use of information collected brings measurable benefits. According to the DPA 
controlling authority, the application can no longer be considered a proportionate 
interference with users' fundamental rights to data protection (edpb.europa.eu, 2020). 
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4. The Effectiveness of Measures to Ensure an Effective Halt of the 
Pandemic. Where is the Borderline? 
 
The already mentioned applying measures that enable the use of modern technologies 
to track people who are sick or exposed to COVID-19-infected persons, counter-
pointedly to the reservations indicated earlier, may be useful for managing a pandemic 
crisis in countries where healthcare is underfunded and at low levels. There is no doubt 
that mobile communications networks can effectively strengthen the classic and, as 
we already know, highly inadequate measures to halt the virus's expansion, such as 
local or regional lock-downs, home quarantine, movement restrictions, isolation of 
patients, or testing. In the doctrine, Iniobong Ekong, Emeka Chukwu, and Martha 
Chukwu point out the example of Nigeria: “There is, therefore, a need to develop and 
adopt new strategies, particularly digitally-enabled strategies, to facilitate a more 
extensive, accurate, seamless, and timely response in line with the high frequency of 
new infections among contacts of confirmed cases (ie, the secondary infection rate) 
[...] Mobile positioning data can significantly improve the capacity and scope of timely 
outbreak response and will help governments as well as other responders in Nigeria. 
When implemented early, there are opportunities to leverage positioning data to break 
the chains of disease transmission in community clusters. It can improve the efficiency 
of currently used field data collection and outbreak investigation platforms when used 
in synergy. While mobile positioning data can be used within the current regulation, 
guidelines for data handlers must include measures to curtail misuse and unauthorized 
access” (Ekong et al., 2020, p. 6). 
 
The praise given to the effectiveness of mobile networks' use to monitor individuals 
who are infected or potential carriers of COVID-19 coronavirus must not obscure the 
fact that individuals' data should be particularly protected and secured against possible 
misuses. 
 
It is important to emphasize that the scale of measures taken by democratic countries, 
which are customarily limited not only by international conventions on human rights, 
but also by constitutional guarantees and the judiciary, on the one hand, and by public 
opinion and independent media, on the other, has completely been outpaced by the 
methods used by the authorities of the People's Republic of China. It is now being 
stressed that mainland China is using artificial intelligence and public surveillance 
tools in an unprecedented way to reduce the virus, the first appearance of which was 
reported in Wuhan in eastern China.  
 
As Shawn Yuan points out, in addition to the thermal scanners visible at Chinese main 
stations in the country's major cities, the government is analyzing the large collection 
of data on communication passengers at its disposal as a result of the implementation 
of regulations requiring travellers to use their real names when traveling. Work is 
currently underway to combine the Chinese facial recognition and identification 







and infrared bands (Yuan, 2020). He emphasizes that: “The Chinese government has 
arguably set up the most expansive and sophisticated surveillance system in the world. 
In addition to the real-name system - which requires people to use government-issued 
ID  cards to buy mobile sims, obtain social media accounts, take a train, board a plane, 
or even buy  groceries - authorities also track people using some 200 million security 
cameras installed nationwide. Some of these cameras are equipped with facial 
recognition technology, allowing authorities to track criminal acts, including offences 
as minor as jaywalking. There are reports authorities are using this extensive 
surveillance system to keep tabs on people amid the coronavirus outbreak” (Yuan, 
2020).    
 
When considering the limits seen by States as effective ones, one cannot overlook the 
use of drones for specific tasks in a pandemic. The particular capabilities of drones, 
allowing them to reach their intended destination quickly, the universality of their use, 
and their prevalence, not only in the military sphere (Górnikiewicz, 2019, p. 25), cause 
that in countries such as India and the People's Republic of China, among others, 
public administration and secret government special agencies are increasingly using 
them. The possibilities to use drones and other unmanned aerial vehicles to combat 
natural disasters and provide humanitarian aid have already been highlighted by Mario 
Estrada and Abrahim Ndoma (2019, p. 378), among others.  
 
However, the scale of drones' involvement in the supervision of compliance with 
sanitary recommendations by the Chinese authorities makes drones an essential tool 
for the control of epidemiological injunctions and the supervision of Chinese society 
during the COVID-19 pandemic. While the authorities in many countries have already 
used unmanned aerial vehicles for public security tasks, the scale of the use of drones 
in China is now unprecedented in comparison with any other country. At present, there 
are several key tasks to be distinguished, which are carried out in the People's 
Republic of China using unmanned aerial vehicles. Drones control body temperature 
and recognize citizens' faces and ensure that assembly bans are observed, monitor that 
citizens obey quarantine, carry out logistical tasks, and carry out aerial spray and 
disinfection [Yang and Reuter, 2020]. The momentum of Chinese security efforts and 
containment of the spread of COVID-19 is described by Zak Doffman, who says: 
“China’s vast surveillance industry fuels the biggest and boldest experiment in 
population monitoring and control the world has ever seen. Whether it’s trivial 
deployments of facial recognition to enforce jaywalking, AI-driven citizen scoring 
based on acceptable behaviours, or the dystopian regime in Xinjiang, China’s security 
and surveillance giants have a real-world laboratory to conduct their research and hone 
their technologies that is not available anywhere else” (Doffman, 2020). 
 
Drones flying in China and ordering citizens to wear a mask, disinfect their hands, or 
go home are now becoming a symbol of our times' security. After all, monitoring of 
public space and the behavior of the population in terms of compliance with the 
injunction issued by public health services has also been noted - albeit on a much 
smaller scale in countries such as among others: France, Italy, Oman, and India. It is 
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interesting to note that opinions have already been expressed that the use of thermal 
imaging cameras installed on drones is not entirely effective (Greenwood, 2020).   
 
Vaishnavi and other researchers stress the importance of the massive use of drones in 
India for decontamination and disinfection of densely populated areas, making it 
possible to protect sanitary workers previously exposed to the infection. If it had not 
been for drones and automatic disinfection, the time needed for this work would have 
been three times longer (Vaishnavi et al., 2020, p. 10). Currently - August 2020, the 
use of drones in Ghana and the United States has also been reported as couriers 
delivering test samples and medical supplies from a local hospital to a nearby disease 
control center, while in Ireland, the use of drones is used to deliver medicines and 
essential supplies to a group of closed households (ITF-OECD, 2020; Shell and 
Haaland, 2020). 
 
The exceptional use of drones in health management tasks also deserves attention 
because it is combined - especially in China - with artificial intelligence (AI) 
mechanisms. The latter is supplemented by access to CCTV systems that track 
infected persons. It may seem a truism to say that artificial intelligence and modern 
technology have become an integral part of our lives today. However, it seems that by 
using such advanced mechanisms of constant supervision of the citizens, the worrying 
vision of the Leviathan State, which absorbs everything, which has been mentioned 
by Tomasz Hobbes in 1651, is being fulfilled. It referred to the exercise of strong 
power by a sovereign. It is puzzling whether and when the aforementioned Leviathan, 
who is the personification of an all-powerful administration in the area of health and 
security, will halt.  
 
However, the answer to this question is not possible until an effective vaccine has 
been invented, or the expected second wave of the coronavirus pandemic proves to be 
milder than scientists expect. Otherwise, we are in danger of functioning in a world 
in which ordinary air travel will involve not only measuring body temperature before 
departure but also biometric scanning to check people's identity, checks on isolation 
after the journey, using the "digital ankle bracelet" tracking apps for travelers (Frost, 
2020). 
 
 It should be noted that Amnesty International has been involved in the debate on legal 
solutions adopted by many countries and the controversial nature of these methods. 
Interestingly, this fact has not yet been more widely recognized by many 
representatives of the doctrine and the public. At present, and this seems perfectly 
understandable, the citizens of most countries are concentrating on taking measures 
to prevent infection rather than on the possible threats that may arise from inadequate 
supervision of the data collected by public government agencies. According to 
Amnesty International, the enhanced supervisory measures must, for their legality, be 
secured by strict criteria, among which the fact that public authorities must be able to 







proportionate, defined as regards time period and implemented with transparency and 
appropriate supervision [amnesty.org, 2020], is particularly important. 
 
The countries that apply extensive disease monitoring measures but are less severe 
than those adopted by the People's Republic of China and Israel include Taiwan, 
Singapore, and South Korea. Moran Amit, Heli Kimhi, Tarif Bader, and other 
researchers stress that Taiwan and Singapore have authorized law enforcement 
authorities to monitor quarantine injunctions remotely issued (Amit et al., 2020, p. 
1167).  
  
Finally, the key question is whether the actions characterized by significant 
interference in citizens' rights by countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, the People's 
Republic of China, and Israel are effective. The World Health Organisation's data 
provide surprising results in this area. The median incidence rate in Israel between the 
30th of June and the end of August 2020 is a steadily increasing curve (sic!) [WHO, 
2020]. On the other hand, in South Korea, the number of infections remained stable 
between the end of June and the 13th of August, followed by an increase in the number 
of infections as Taiwan is not a member of the WHO, the data collected by WHO do 
not cover this country. According to information made available by the World Health 
Organization, the number of cases in the People's Republic of China has remained 
stable over the period analyzed. Assuming the complementarity of data on China, the 
Chinese authorities have managed almost completely to flatten the number of cases.    
  
As has already been pointed out, when we bring the extreme models for monitoring 
the spread of COVID-19, counterpointed to the countries authorizing the use of more 
or less intrusive means of identifying and tracing infected people's rights, the Swedish 
Government's specific free policy must be distinguished. The latter policy, 
paradoxically, has proved no less effective than the countries mentioned earlier. 
Currently, the disease curve in Sweden (as of August 31, 2020) is close to flattening. 
 
While it may seem a high-profile statement that it is the crises that most force changes 
and amendments to the content of legislation, there is no doubt that the current 
pandemic will, like no other, become an impetus for enforcement of changes in the 
application of the emergency provisions for the protection of public health and safety 
in general. An example is South Korea, which faced a crisis caused by the MERS 
virus in 2015. Thirty-six people died as a result, and more than one hundred and eighty 
were infected. The South Korean authorities then amended the Infectious Disease 
Control and Prevention Act (IDPCA).  
 
As part of the amendment of the Act, in order to prevent infectious diseases and halt 
the spread of infection, the Minister of Health and Welfare of South Korea has been 
equipped with an effective tool (Article 76 section 2 of the Act) that empowers to 
request, from the directors of the competent central administrative bodies and public 
institutions, information concerning both patients with infectious diseases and persons 
who may be infected with such diseases. The Act lays down, inter alia, the right to 
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collect information such as personal data, including names, resident registration 
numbers, addresses, and mobile phone numbers, prescription data, records of 
immigration control during the period determined by the Minister of Health and 
Welfare, and finally other pieces of information prescribed by Presidential Decree for 
monitoring the movement paths of patients with infectious diseases. The Minister for 
Health and Social Welfare also has the right to contact the Police authorities to obtain 
information on the location of patients with infectious diseases and people suspected 
of being infected (IDPCA, 2016, 76(2); Kim and Tak, 2020). 
 
Some of the mechanisms for restricting COVID-19, mentioned above, appear to be 
close to the authoritarian countries see carrying out surveillance of citizens by means 
of drones, while other mechanisms, such as the collection of mobile phone data, are 
seen by human rights organizations as highly worrying. It is important that, once the 
COVID-19 coronavirus threat has been contained, governments should as soon as 
possible give up the maintenance of the emergency powers of the government 
agencies and the secret government special agencies, the use of general bailiffs in 
security regulations, the continued use of extended executive powers and, finally, the 
reduction in transparency of the protective measures taken. For example, the European 
Journal of International Law links the COVID-19 pandemic's use to monopolize its 
power, referring to the example of Hungary.  
 
It came as no big surprise that Orbán has used COVID-19 to dismantle further the 
checks and balances that are an integral part of any functioning democracy.  On March 
30, 2020, with the authorization of the Hungarian Parliament (in which the 
government has a large majority), an Act was passed, which effectively gave the 
government sweeping powers to rule by decree. It is not unusual in times of emergency 
for the executive branch to revert to extraordinary measures, though in this case they 
have a Hungarian twist the new law is of indeterminate duration (though Parliament 
can end it when it sees fit – in the case of Hungary de facto when the Executive sees 
fit) and the powers granted exceed those necessary to deal with COVID.  
 
More ominously, alongside that enabling law, the Penal Code was amended, 
permanently, to introduce two new crimes – punishable by up to five years’ 
imprisonment for any activity that interferes with the government in the discharge of 
its emergency responsibility and for any publication ‘distorting the truth’ that might 
alarm a large number of persons – which I imagine could mean any publication that 
contradicts the government narrative (EJIL, 2020, p. 3). 
 
In the context of the above, it is legitimate to conclude that the longer the public 
administration and government agencies rely on the rules typical of emergencies, the 
more likely human rights are violated. In their rhetoric and conduct, the citizens of 
countries whose authorities are approaching the thin line between democracy and 









Ultimately, it is necessary to make a bitter finding that, despite the constant 
politicization of human rights, the creation of ever more perfect and complete 
catalogues of individual rights, or the emphasis placed by representatives of the 
doctrine of law on successive generations of human rights, in the face of the COVID-
19 coronavirus pandemic, the current belief in the sustainability of the system of 
values, developed since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
in the field of the protection of individual rights, is under threat. For completeness, it 
should be noted that the last such dangerous pandemic of an influenza virus called the 
Spanish were between 1918 and 1920. It should be stressed that the scale of the losses 
caused by the current threat posed by COVID-19 is not limited to more than 24 million 
infected and more than 827,000 dead. The terrifying balance sheet of a pandemic also 
has an economic, social, or, importantly, legal dimension. 
 
It seems justified to conclude that the period of a pandemic is a kind of test for 
democratic mechanisms because often State bodies, motivated by their intentions to 
ensure the effectiveness of the protective measures taken to protect the safety and 
security of citizens, will continue to take both praeter legem and contra legem actions. 
As has been pointed out, in the case of Israel, it is the Supreme Court that has proved 
to be the institution that upholds the mechanisms of a democratic State, in particular, 
in the scope of the judicial control of public administration activities. The importance 
of independent and sovereign courts in this area is all the more important because the 
public often learns about actions taken that violate the citizen's right to privacy post 
factum. In such cases, the courts' guarantee, and stabilizing role as bodies responsible 
for protecting the foundations of democratic order and the legal order is crucial. 
  
There is now a clear shift away from the belief that international management of health 
and its protection globally is effective. There is no doubt that in the short term, it will 
be essential to rebuild confidence in the World Health Organisation on the part of 
some countries, especially given the expected second wave of the disease, projected 
by some specialists for autumn 2020 [Maragakis, 2020]. This statement should be 
supplemented by the conclusion that there is a high probability of changes in the 
content of the existing international agreements in the sphere of international human 
rights law.  
 
The current pandemic may also be an opportunity for the international community to 
adopt further specialized international agreements, in which norm-setters shall make 
detailed reference to the most modern technologies used by some countries today. It 
is reasonable to conclude that the essence of these changes and the speed they will 
adopt, both in international and national law, being elaborated by legislators and legal 
doctrine, will depend on the actual impacts, especially on the second wave of the 
pandemic. As the author pointed out earlier, stressing the importance of international 
conventions on the protection of human rights for the legal systems of individual 
countries: “[…] Today, a significant proportion of the legal norms which constitute 
the legal standards of international human rights protection stem directly from 
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international conventions, and not from the standards of protection in force in the 
national legal systems of individual countries. An example of this phenomenon is the 
increasingly widespread creation of human rights catalogues by means of 
international agreements, the creation and functioning of bodies of transit judiciary, 
or last but not least the process of securing and guaranteeing human rights by means 
of continuous development of the system of international humanitarian law […]” 
(Kowalski, 2019, p. 115). 
 
Irrespective of the further evolution of the pandemic and the effectiveness of 
individual countries' actions, there is no doubt that the application of the exceptional 
and specific measures identified, based on the use of tools to track and monitor 
citizens, should be temporary, necessary, and proportionate to the scale of the threat.  
 
Although the scale of the threat posed by the COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic, since 
the Spanish flu pandemic at the beginning of the 20th century, is unparalleled and it 
is also difficult from a legal point of view to nuance this requirement of a 
proportionality rule, there is no doubt, however, that once the current threat is 
contained, there will be a necessary redefinition of the material, legal and procedural 
conditions associated with the application of disease control measures during 
pandemic conditions in national legal systems.  
 
This process will be of particular importance in the democratic States of law, where it 
is customary for societies to consider the application of restrictive regulations to be 
acceptable only in states of emergency. In conclusion, it can be said that the real test 
of the effectiveness of the legal solutions used by States to combat the pandemic will 
be an assessment of the effects of the expected second wave of COVID-19. The more 
serious its balance sheet will be, the more we can be sure that the technological 
measures harnessed to provide security will become increasingly sophisticated and 
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